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On optimal unemployment compensation
16 references·1 citing·46 second hop
On optimal unemployment compensation (2006)On optimal unemployment compensationOptimal Unemployment Insurance (1997)Optimal Unemployment InsuranceUnemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy (1996)Unemployment insurance with m…Unemployment duration, benefit duration, and the business cycle (1996)Unemployment duration, benefi…Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance (1995)Efficiency and Equality in a …Consumption Growth, the Interest Rate and Aggregation (1993)Consumption Growth, the Inter…Unemployment: macroeconomic performance and the labour market (1992)Unemployment: macroeconomic p…The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard (1992)The Role of Unemployment Insu…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima (1991)Computing Multi-Period, Infor…Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (1990)Toward a Theory of Discounted…Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (1990)Short-term contracts and long…Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem (1990)Income fluctuation and asymme…On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting (1987)On Repeated Moral Hazard with…Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade (1987)Contractual Arrangements for …The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time (1979)The Optimal Payment of Unempl…The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time (1978)The Optimal Payment of Unempl…Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs (2013)Search and Work in Optimal We…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1986)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence (1988)Chapter 2 The theory of the firm (1989)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986)Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment (1996)Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics (2004)THE LIFE CYCLE HYPOTHESIS OF SAVING: AGGREGATE IMPLICATIONS AND TESTS (1963)Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption (1981)Asset Pricing at the Millennium (2000)The Effect of Parental Transfers and Borrowing Constraints on Educational Attainment (2001)Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy (2010)Unemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells (1988)Productivity gains from unemployment insurance (2000)A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance (2006)The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over 20 Years (2012)Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations (1982)Indivisible labor and the business cycle (1985)The equity premium: A puzzle (1985)Quantitative Macroeconomics with Heterogeneous Households (2009)Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle (2010)The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income (1981)Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts (1988)Communication, commitment, and growth (1992)Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage (2001)Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2006)Sequential Equilibria (1982)The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994)Relational Incentive Contracts (2003)Repeated Games and Reputations (2006)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching FunctionSocial Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (1999)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Implicit Contracts: A Survey (1985)Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research (2006)The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass (2008)
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References

  • 1992Unemployment: macroeconomic performance and the labour market3,291 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
  • 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting641 cited
  • 1997Optimal Unemployment Insurance606 cited
  • 1993Consumption Growth, the Interest Rate and Aggregation527 cited
  • 1990Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships484 cited
  • 1992The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard393 cited
  • 1979The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time364 cited
  • 1990Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem363 cited
  • 1987Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade304 cited
  • 1991Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima268 cited
  • 1996Unemployment duration, benefit duration, and the business cycle248 cited
  • 1978The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time222 cited
  • 1995Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance157 cited

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  • 1996Unemployment insurance with moral hazard in a dynamic economy146 cited
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    • 2013Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs17 cited