What does it take to move a society from an inefficient equilibrium, characterized by low social capital, distrust and inefficient legal and political institutions, to the opposite situation? The starting point is a discussion of solutions to the `social dilemma' problem presented in rational choice theory, which are found wanting. Without norms of trust, the `tragedy of the commons' is unavoidable. An institutional mechanism is identified which implies that trust can be established `from above', that is, the trustworthiness of `efficient' institutions creates interpersonal trust, which in its turn makes the `production' of social capital in civil society possible. It is argued that the theory of `collective memories' can serve as the missing link in the theory of social capital and game-theoretical explanations of cooperation. The advantage of this approach is that it brings action and power into the theory of social capital and social dilemmas.
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