TAX EVASION AND THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS

Dan Usher

108 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Taxation and Compliance Studies Economic and Fiscal Studies Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

Abstract

Tax evasion and deadweight loss have similar implications for the rules of public finance. The optimal mix of taxes can be derived from the minimization of the sum of aggregate deadweight loss and aggregate cost of tax evasion. Similarly, the marginal cost of public funds includes allowances for marginal deadweight loss and marginal cost of tax evasion per dollar of public revenue acquired.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 108 citations exist upstream.

References

1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure 1981Lectures on Public Economics.1983Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns 1974Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods 1985Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework 1983The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad.1976The Marginal Cost of Public Funds

Cited by

1996Administrative corruption and taxation 1991Tax evasion and occupational choice 1990TAX SHELTERING AND THE COST OF EVASION *1998A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation 1998Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.