An assessment of corporate governance reforms in Italy based on a comparative analysis of earnings management

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of corporate governance reforms in Italy. Design/methodology/approach – The authors argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance can best be assessed with reference to the choices made by management or controlling shareholders. They use the curtailment of earnings management as a desirable and measureable outcome of good corporate governance to assess Italy’s progress since the 1990s. The UK is used as a reference point because it is a European Union (EU) economy of comparable size and there is evidence that its firms managed earnings to a much lesser extent than their counterparts in Italy in the 1990s. A matched sample of UK and Italian firms was used for the empirical analysis. Findings – It was found that in contrast to the situation in the 1990s, firms in Italy do not manage earnings to a greater extent than their UK counterparts after the corporate governance reforms. In addition, firm-level governance has a greater effect on earnings management in Italy than in the UK. The authors attribute this to firm-level governance compensating for deficiencies in national institutions. Research limitations/implications – The restriction of earnings management is just one positive consequence of good governance. Other positive outcomes require to be studied to form a complete picture of the impact of governance reforms in Italy. Originality/value – This paper is the first to use an outcome-driven approach to evaluate the impact of governance reforms.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 20 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.