On the Logic of "Intrinsically Better"

Abstract

i . For purposes of illustration, we proceed from a hedonistic assumption. We assume that pleasure is intrinsically good and displeasure intrinsically bad; or, more exactly, that any state of affairs con? sisting of more pleasure than displeasure is intrin? sically good, and that any state of affairs consisting of more displeasure than pleasure is intrinsically bad. And for simplicity of exposition, we shall also assume that pleasure is the only thing that is intrin? sically good and displeasure the only thing that is intrinsically bad. What we shall say, however, may readily be accommodated to the assumption that there are other things?states of affairs other than those involving pleasure?that are intrinsically good, and other things that are intrinsically bad. We are assuming, therefore, that there are states of affairs, some of which are exemplified and some of which are not exemplified. Ordinarily, one would not say of any unexemplified state of affairs (say, that of everyone being happy) that it is good, or bad, or better than some other state of affairs. One might say, instead, that the state of affairs is one which would be good, or bad, or better than some state of affairs, if only it were exemplified. For convenience, however, we shall speak of un exemplified states of affairs as being good, or bad, or better than other states of affairs. 2. We also assume that the concepts of intrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness are clear?that the reader can understand what is meant by saying that pleasure as such, considered by itself and as if alone, is good in itself or good as an end, and that displeasure as such, considered by itself and as if alone, is bad in itself or bad as an end. Any pos? sible world (giTTen our hedonistic assumptions) is good just to the extent that it contains more pleasure than displeasure and bad just to the extent that it contains more displeasure than pleasure.1 And we shall assume, finally, that if the concepts of intrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness are clear, then the concept of intrinsic betterness is also clear. For example, given our hedonistic assumptions, we may say that a state of affairs that involves pleasure and no displeasure is intrinsically better than one that involves neither pleasure nor displeasure ; and one that involves neither pleasure nor displeasure is intrinsically better than one that involves displeasure and no pleasure.2 3. First, we shall attempt to indicate that certain principles about the logic of betterness are false if they are interpreted as principles about the logic of intrinsic betterness. We shall single out five prin? ciples in particular which are now widely held.3 They are :

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