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Optimal Incentive Contract with Risk-Neutral Contractor
16 references·4 citing·37 second hop
Optimal Incentive Contract with Risk-Neutral Contractor (2012)Optimal Incentive Contract with Risk-Neut…Making Hard Decisions with DecisionTools (2013)Making Hard Decisions with De…Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory (2006)Games and Information: An Int…Trust in project relationships—inside the black box (2003)Trust in project relationship…Project risk management in the Queensland engineering construction industry: a survey (2003)Project risk management in th…The Theory of Incentives (2002)The Theory of IncentivesDecision analysis for management judgment (1992)Decision analysis for managem…Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Multitask Principal–Agent Ana…Systematic Risk Management Approach for Construction Projects (1990)Systematic Risk Management Ap…Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Agency Theory: An Assessment …Decision Analysis: Practice and Promise (1988)Decision Analysis: Practice a…Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityRisk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1976)Risk Aversion in the Small an…Probability Concepts in Engineering Planning and Design (1975)Probability Concepts in Engin…Probability, statistics, and decision for civil engineers (1970)Probability, statistics, and …Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (1964)Risk Aversion in the Small an…Risk Assessment Model for Optimal Gain–Pain Share Ratio in Target Cost Contract for Construction Projects (2021)Risk Assessment Model for Opt…Study on incentive and supervision mechanisms of technological innovation in megaprojects based on the principal-agent theory (2020)Study on incentive and superv…Incentive Mechanisms in Mega Project-Risk Management Considering Owner and Insurance Company as Principals (2020)Incentive Mechanisms in Mega …Owner’s Risk Allocation and Contractor’s Role Behavior in a Project: A Parallel-mediation Model (2018)Owner’s Risk Allocation and C…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)STRATEGY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES. 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(1992)Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups (1992)The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust (1994)Narrow Reliability Bounds for Structural Systems (1979)Reliability-based optimization in structural engineering (1994)Stochastic Dynamics of Marine Structures (2012)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)Auctions for conservation contracts: an empirical examination of Victoria's BushTender trial (2003)Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism (2003)The company of strangers: a natural history of economic life (2004)On the measurement of inequality (1970)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (1976)
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References

  • 1989Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review13,327 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
  • 1964Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large4,964 cited
  • 1976Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large4,655 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1975Probability Concepts in Engineering Planning and Design2,575 cited
  • 2002The Theory of Incentives2,116 cited
  • 1970Probability, statistics, and decision for civil engineers1,880 cited
  • 2006Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory1,188 cited
  • 1988Decision Analysis: Practice and Promise770 cited
  • 2013Making Hard Decisions with DecisionTools749 cited
  • 2003Trust in project relationships—inside the black box584 cited
  • 1990Systematic Risk Management Approach for Construction Projects414 cited
  • 1992Decision analysis for management judgment340 cited
  • 2003Project risk management in the Queensland engineering construction industry: a survey

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340 cited

Cited by

  • 2020Study on incentive and supervision mechanisms of technological innovation in megaprojects based on the principal-agent theory51 cited
  • 2021Risk Assessment Model for Optimal Gain–Pain Share Ratio in Target Cost Contract for Construction Projects46 cited
  • 2020Incentive Mechanisms in Mega Project-Risk Management Considering Owner and Insurance Company as Principals38 cited
  • 2018Owner’s Risk Allocation and Contractor’s Role Behavior in a Project: A Parallel-mediation Model35 cited