Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers

Abstract

Theory: Voters, as Downs (1957) argues, cast instrumental rather than expressive votes. Voters choose between candidates based on the policy outcomes they expect from the candidates rather than on the policy platforms of the candidates. Voters' expectations about the policy outputs of candidates depend on the partisan control of the separate branches of government in a separation of powers system. Hypotheses: Voters perceive differences between a presidential candidate's policy platform and the expected policy outcome of a government with the candidate in office. The perceived differences in policy outcomes and policy platforms are influenced by voters' expectations about partisan control of the legislature. Voters' choice of candidates depends more on the distance between voter ideal points and expected policy outcomes under each candidate than on the distance between voter ideal points and candidate platforms. Methods: Analysis of data from a 1996 Texas poll in which voters were asked to place the ideological positions of Bob Dole and Bill Clinton along with the ideological position of the government with Bob Dole or Bill Clinton as president. Results: Voters' support for presidential candidates is more strongly related to their proximity to the policy outcomes they expect from each candidate's election than to their proximity to the candidate's policy position.

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