Why the Sociology of Morality Needs Bourdieu's Habitus*

Abstract

Though Pierre Bourdieu has been criticized for ignoring the moral dimensions of social judgments, I suggest that his habitus concept can provide a useful theoretical foundation for a sociological analysis of morality. If the habitus is revised in a way that recognizes the embodied nature of cognition, it can be treated as a foundation for moral judgments of the self and of others. A revised habitus concept can account for two processes by which moral judgments are shaped by social settings: (1) cultural influences on feelings and expressions of emotion; and (2) the ways moral metaphors are structured by embodied cognitive schemas. In both processes, universal bodily operations are employed in different configurations across cultural settings. I argue that a modified habitus concept that can account for these phenomena has significant implications for the sociological analysis of lay morality.

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