SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Shareholders and the Atom of Property: Fission or Fusion?
16 references·0 citing·35 second hop
Shareholders and the Atom of Property: Fission or Fusion? (2000)Shareholders and the Atom of Property: Fi…The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Shareholder Reactions (1998)The Symbolic Management of St…For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1998)For Whom Are Corporate Manage…A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)A Survey of Corporate Governa…The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications (1995)The Stakeholder Theory of the…Strong Managers, Weak Owners (1994)Strong Managers, Weak OwnersLarge Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium (1994)Large Shareholder Activism, R…A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control (1994)A Social Movement Perspective…Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Property Rights and the Natur…The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Large Shareholders and Corpor…Toward a Theory of Property Rights (1974)Toward a Theory of Property R…Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class (1974)Corporate Ownership and Contr…Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970)Exit, Voice, and LoyaltyThe Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note (1932)For Whom Corporate Managers A…For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1932)For Whom Are Corporate Manage…The Nature of the Firm (1937)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Unbundling Institutions (2005)Towards a Theory of Ecosystems (2018)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)Institutions (1991)The quality of government (1999)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts (1997)Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective (2001)Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis (2003)Strategic management a stakeholder approach (2010)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness (1985)The financialization of the American economy (2005)Putting the S back in corporate social responsibility: A multilevel theory of social change in organizations (2007)Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? an institutional theory of corporate social responsibility (2007)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Law and Finance (1998)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships (1987)STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES (1991)The myopia of learning (1993)Institutions, financial markets, and firm debt maturity (1999)Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity (2015)Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (2018)Legal Determinants of External Finance (1997)Investor protection and corporate governance (2000)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1997A Survey of Corporate Governance16,237 cited
  • 1995The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications12,852 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control8,403 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 1974Toward a Theory of Property Rights3,871 cited
  • 1970Exit, Voice, and Loyalty3,626 cited
  • 1994Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium903 cited
  • 1994A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control858 cited
  • 1932For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?856 cited
  • 1998The Symbolic Management of Stockholders: Corporate Governance Reforms and Shareholder Reactions804 cited
  • 1994Strong Managers, Weak Owners711 cited
  • 1974Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class621 cited
  • 1998For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?548 cited
  • 1932For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

439 cited

Cited by

No citing works inside the corpus for this window.