Article2009

When Do Firms Prefer Individual Action to Collective Action in The Pursuit of Corporate Political Strategy? A New Perspective on Industry Concentration

67 citations0/0 files storedBusiness and Politics

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Political Influence and Corporate Strategies International Business and FDI Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting

Abstract

In this study we advance the current research on corporate political strategy by examining how firms decide on their level of engagement in political action. This study proposes a contingency approach that identifies conditions in which firms prefer individual action to collective action in their pursuit of political strategy and introduces a framework that addresses this preference. Our results show that even in concentrated industries, a firm's preference of individual action over collective action varies when government contracts or research and development intensity are important considerations.

Citations in this library

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References

1991Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage 1983The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields 2004Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage 1977Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony 2004The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields 1984A resource‐based view of the firm 1965The Logic of Collective Action 1995The Theory of the Growth of the Firm

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