Of balloons and bicycles--or--the relationship between ethical theory and practical judgment.

Abstract

The relationship between ethical theory and practical judgment is not a happy or a stable one; while two live together in some fashion, terms cohabitation are not clear to most interested observers. I have to wonder what it is that most us see as signs instability. As I reflect on this I direct your attention to photo (opposite) a wire sculpture presented to me by one my students some years ago. It depicts a hot-air balloon, made from a toilet float, and a small tricycle sitting on ground beneath balloon. Let us suppose tricycle is a proper, cross-country conveyance-a bicycle, in fact-and image will serve nicely as a simile for relationship between theory and practical judgment: bicycle is like practical judgment, hot-air balloon is like ethical theory. By theory, I mean any collection meaningful assertions, descriptions, and explanations that attempt to give a big about moral beliefs, attitudes, and behavior, a picture big enough that by looking intently at it, one can answer all tough questions that seem important to proponent theory. I refer to grand theories contrived by thinkers from ancient times to today: Plato's Ideas, Aristotle's Telos, Augustine's Two Cities, St. Thomas's Natural Law, Luther's Two Kingdoms, Hobbes's State Nature, Spinoza's Ethica More Geometrico, Locke's Contract, Kant's Categorical Imperative, Bentham and Mills's Utility, Rawls's Original Position, and so forth and so on. Obviously, each these is radically different from others; yet all are attempts to paint a picture with a set ideas that is big enough and profound enough to make intellectual sense moral life, at least to proponents and because proponents wrote these ideas in books) to those everywhere and anywhere who read their books. I want this simile balloon and bicycle to make four points. The first point is that philosophical problem relationship between theory and practice is much older than hot-air balloons and bicycles, one which was invented in eighteenth century and other in nineteenth. Plato worried about problem and he elegantly describes it in sixth book Republic, where he depicts those who have the perfect vision [the word is theoria 'vision thing' disdained by presidents and delighting philosophers] other that orders laws about beauty, goodness and justice in this world (6.484). Aristotle struggled with problem: sixth book Nichomachean Ethics distinguishes theoretical wisdom sophia) from practical wisdom (phronesis) by noting that philosophers Anaxagoras and Thales had sophia of extraordinary, wonderful, difficult and superhuman things, but such knowledge is useless because good they are seeking is not human. Phronesis, on other hand, is concerned with human affairs and with matters about which deliberation is possible (6.11411b). As he was about to embark on his great study moral behavior, St. Thomas slyly remarked, Sermones morales universales sunt minus utiles, eo quod actiones sunt in particularibus, (Summa Theologica 2-2ae). His teaching about relation between moral scientia principles and practical judgment prudence was debated by his followers for several centuries. Thus, problem is not at all new, not at all simple: who am I to write anything new or simple about it in next few lines? The second point is this: from balloon one gets a wide view landscape, and horizons are far and on all sides. From bicycle, one sees only bumpy road ahead, fallen tree limbs, and dogs in bushes. Theory, in this view, is a speculative fashioning scope human life or action. It is very loosely tethered to ground and can float quite free. It knows very little about trials and dangers, thrills and fun riding bicycle, because it sees details human life only from a great distance, and often not at all. …

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 46 citations exist upstream.