Acceptable points in games of perfect information

Robert J. Aumann

112 citations0/0 files storedPacific Journal of Mathematics

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Game Theory and Applications Advanced Topology and Set Theory Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

COROLLARY 11.2.Every stable game of perfect information has strong equilibrium m-points in supergame pure strategies.Finally, we remark that the discussion of § 6 applies unchanged to the non-cooperative case.

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2019Theory of games and economic behavior 1989Non-cooperative games 1953Stochastic Games 2006Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

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1980Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames 1994Equilibrium in Supergames 1999Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known 1998Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata

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