Objectivism and the study of man (part I)

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to show that the distinctions made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber between the natural sciences and the ‘Geisteswissen‐schaften’ are sound in principle, pace the arguments to the contrary within classical logical empiricism. It is held that intentional contexts are characteristic of social science. Intentional contexts are held to be more important in psychology than mental states, like toothache. If logical behaviourism is to have any plausibility, it has to be shown how intentional contexts can be dealt with. Carnap's programme was to reconstruct scientific discourse within a truth‐functional language. It is argued that his reduction of belief‐sentences was not successful. It is further argued that in the logical empiricist's discussions of the problem of Verstehen, only motivational understanding is taken account of, what Max Weber calls observational understanding is overlooked as we try to show through a discussion of Theodore Abel's well‐known explication of ‘the operation called Verstehen’. From this it is concluded that the founda‐tional problems of social science are different from those of natural science, and this conclusion is further elaborated through an exposition of views held by authors in the German tradition, which, in the fifties, many philosophers held to be obsolete.

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