Much of contemporary epistemology takes place in the shadow of the internalism/externalism debate. Its current place on the centre stage of epistemology seems appropriate given the dramatic revolution in our thought about historical and contemporary epistemological inquiry that would seem to be forced by certain paradigm externalist views. But although the controversy seems to strike deep at the heart of fundamental epistemological issues, I am not certain that it has been clearly defined. It seems to me that philosophers are choosing sides without a thorough understanding of what the respective views entail. In this paper I want to explore a number of different ways of defining the technical distinction between internalist and externalist epistemologies. As is so often the case with technical philosophical distinctions, it is probably foolish to insist that there is only one correct way to define the distinction. I am interested in developing a way of understanding the controversy so that it leaves many philosophers already recognized as paradigm internalists and externalists in their respective categories, but this is not my main goal. Indeed, while my ultimate suggestion as to how to understand internalism will include as internalists many in the history of philosophy, it may be harder to find contemporary epistemologists who satisfy my internalist criteria. My primary concerns are to define the controversy in such a way that it a) involves a fundamentally important distinction, and b) articulates the source of the underlying dissatisfac-
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 37 citations exist upstream.