Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance

Abstract

Researchers on China's environmental governance have usually maintained that the inferior bureaucratic status of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) (formerly the National Environmental Protection Agency) and its local agencies have accounted for the limited enforcement of environmental regulations in China. Environmental agencies at all levels have found it difficult to obtain active support and co-operation from other bureaucratic authorities in charge of economic development to take a tough stand on tackling environmental problems. Strong and influential government agencies such as planning commissions (jiwei), economic commissions (jingwei), construction commissions (jianwei), and industrial and commercial authorities are known to be reluctant to endorse and enforce stringent environmental measures for fear that they might slow down economic growth. With a strong pro-growth orientation, both central and local governments have usually sided with these economic bureaus and have subordinated environmental protection to economic interests when the two have been in conflict.

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