An empirical investigation of agency relationships and capital structure of property management firms in the UK

John J. Theis · Michael Casey

18 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Property Investment and Finance

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance Working Capital and Financial Performance

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between various agency factors and debt of property management firms in the UK. Findings indicate that debt is significantly inversely related to percentage of shares closely held, dividend yield and price‐to‐book ratio. Size, measured by sales volume, appears to be insignificant in determining debt level.

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1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1988The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice 1963CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AND THE COST OF CAPITAL: A CORRECTION 1991The Theory of Capital Structure 1990Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies 1995Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns 1984Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends 1984On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence

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