Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment

Abstract

The end of the Cold War brought widespread optimism about the future of civil-military relations. With a declining need for military preparedness, it seemed, civilian authorities would be better able to exert control over military policies and decision making. But, argues Michael Desch in this volume, the truth is precisely the opposite. In war-time, he explains, civil authorities cannot help paying close attention to military matters. In times of peace, however, the civilian sector is less interested in military affairs - and therefore leaves them to the military. Focusing on a range of times and places, Desch begins with a look at changes in US civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. He then turns to the former Soviet Union, explaining why it was easier for civilians to control the Soviet military than its present-day Russian successor. He examines the Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship in World War I Germany, Japan during the interwar era, and the French role in the Algerian crisis. Finally, he explores the changing domestic security environment and civil-military relations in southern Latin America.

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