Justices as Representatives

Abstract

This study demonstrates that state supreme court justices are influenced by their specific electoral backgrounds and experiences, as well as general electoral conditions, when voting to uphold or overturn death sentences in the capital murder cases before their courts. Although previous research has established that electoral forces affect justices' decisions not to dissent, this article suggests that electoral variables also influence justices' decisions about who actually wins or loses the cases. On the basis of a probit analysis of death penalty votes in four supreme courts (Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas) from 1983 through 1988, this study finds that single-member districts, narrow vote margins, being at the end of a term, and experience with electoral politics are associated with support for the death penalty, the position favored by the voters in these states. In addition, the model reveals that prosecutorial experience, term length, and murder rates within states also affect support for the death penalty. Most basically, the goals of judicial actors include personal as well as policy considerations, and the pursuit of these goals is promoted or inhibited by particular types of institutional arrangements.

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