Performance, valuation and capital structure: survey of family firms

Abstract

Purpose Most countries often have public companies with large controlling owners, typically a family. This empirical evidence aims to contrast with the classical view of the largest dispersed firm presented by Berle and Means and challenge the findings by Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, who predict that the shares held by families will decrease if an efficient financial market is put in place. Therefore, family firms represent an important group in the stock market today. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the family as a controlling owner on firms' performance, valuation and capital structure. Design/methodology/approach The paper reviews the current literature related to how family (taking into account specific governance characteristics such as family ownership, family control and family management) affects firms' performance and value. Findings The literature review showed that founder family control and professional (outside) management increase performance, whereas excess control via control enhancing mechanisms (such as dual class shares and pyramidal structures) and descendent management produce both lower valuation and performance. This evidence suggests that families have the incentives and the power to systematically expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. Originality/value Previous research shows that family firms on average perform better than non‐family firms. But this is a non‐linear relation due the fact that the relationship between family ownership and performance cannot be identified without distinguishing between control and cash‐flow rights. Thus, the literature review as a whole emphasizes that the incentives for the controlling shareholder to engage in expropriation are a function of the institutional framework in which the firm operates. So, for further research, it is important to investigate how family firms perform in different corporate governance systems. A policy implication is the necessity to improve minority shareholders' protection from the risk of expropriation by large shareholders.

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