Article1997

Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives

340 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Auction Theory and Applications Accounting and Organizational Management Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

It is well known that comparative performance information (CPI) can enhance efficiency in static principal‐agent relationships by improving the trade‐off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts. In dynamic settings, however, there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives, for example, managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation. We show that the dynamic effects of CPI on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar (static) insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency. The overall welfare effects of CPI are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure.

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References

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