Sectoral targets for developing countries: combining ‘common but differentiated re-sponsibilities’ with ‘meaningful participation’

Abstract

Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price.

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