Post‐modern conflict: Warlords, post‐adjustment states and private protection

Abstract

This paper provides a critical alternative to two key aspects of conventional wisdom in international policy. First, the prevailing notion of internal or intra‐state war as bounded by traditional views of the nation‐state. Second, the development model of conflict which regards so‐called internal war as originating from poverty, scarcity or weak institutions. In distinction, the idea of post‐modern conflict addresses the emergence of political projects in the South, including qualified state forms, which no longer need to establish territorial, bureaucratic or consent‐based political authority. Moreover, rather than scarcity or breakdown, despite the high social costs involved, protracted instability can be associated with innovative and expanding forms of political economy. Using material from Africa and the European East, the paper examines some of the relations and structures involved. Warlords, for example, have forged new and viable links with international organisations and global markets. At the same time, many post‐adjustment rulers, in terms of state debureaucratisation and the embrace of the free market have adopted warlord‐type strategies. The changing architecture of the nation‐state has also weakened the rule of law and blurred traditional responsibilities. This has created a demand for private protection at all levels within the emerging system.

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