Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge

Abstract

This book highlights one particular aspect of culture – that of enabling common knowledge among individuals. A fact is common knowledge if everybody knows it; everybody knows that everybody knows it; and so on ad infinitum. For Economists and Game Theorists, it is well known that common knowledge (and not just mutual knowledge) is essential for achieving coordination (Rubinstein, 1989). In a nutshell, if participating in a public enterprise – from stag‐hunt to underground activities – would turn very sour for each participant unless everybody (or at least enough other people) participates, each individual might avoid the enterprise altogether in the lack of common knowledge that everybody indeed opts in. Embarking from this theoretical insight, Chwe discusses a remarkable array of examples of social institutions and arrangements that bring about common knowledge. These include public ceremonies, rituals, parades and dances to announce and recognise authority and norms; inward facing architecture; focal‐place‐and‐time advertisement of items whose value to individuals hinges on collective consumption or awareness; cohesive social networks; and many more. The appendix delivers an accessible presentation of the abstract formulation of knowledge and common knowledge.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 105 citations exist upstream.