DYNAMIC SEIGNIORAGE THEORY

Maurice Obstfeld

19 citations0/0 files storedMacroeconomic Dynamics

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Economic theories and models

Abstract

This paper develops a dynamic model of seigniorage in which economies' equilibrium paths reflect the ongoing strategic interaction between an optimizing government and a rational public. The model extends existing positive models of monetary policy and inflation by explicitly incorporating the intertemporal linkages among budget deficits, debt, and inflation. A central finding is that the public's rational responses to government policies may well create incentives for the government to reduce inflation and the public debt over time. A sufficiently myopic government may, however, provoke a rising equilibrium path of inflation and public debt.

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References

1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans 1979On the Determination of the Public Debt 1983Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital 1985The Political Economy of Federalism 1978On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy 1995The Political Economy of Budget Deficits 1988Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory 1988A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs

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