When apple definitions become orange realities in banana theories: Epistemological and psychophysiological considerations on Lindahl's analysis of vicarious instigation research

Abstract

Abstract.— Lindahl's (1977) analysis of research on vicarious instigation and conditioning is examined. It is argued that her paper fails to contribute to the field because of a series of fundamental misconceptions. First, empirical and theoretical levels are confused in the definition of constructs. Second, scientific status and usefulness in understanding everyday life phenomena are confused in the assessment of the contribution of vicarious processes research. Third, an idiosyncratic definition of emotion is presented as the only possible one, and research on vicarious instigation, which has an alternative view of emotion, is criticized for not dealing with issues raised by this definition. Fourth, Lindahl has misunderstood the role of psychophysiological data, and the conceptual status of the term “emotion”. Fifth, her paper falls short on several specitic points, including serious misunderstandings of basic aspects of classical conditioning, and a confusion of functionally and structurally defined descriptive terms. Finally, we suggest some problems in research on vicarious instigation and conditioning that would benefit from a critical analysis.

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