Are psychological “ethics codes” morally oblique?

Abstract

The question is raised whether the American and Canadian codes of ethics for psychologists (codes) are able to address some of the most important moral issues that have plagued the discipline of psychology in recent history. Applying Habermas’s distinction between pragmatic, ethical, and moral reasoning, the codes are challenged on moral grounds and calls for reflexivity are articulated. Using examples from academia and psychological practice, lacunae of the codes are disclosed. First it is argued that the ethics codes are not equipped to deal with epistemological violence that is expressed in some research articles. Second it is suggested that the codes, despite their apparently clear articulation, are not immune to ideological changes that have been observed on the background of the “War on Terror.” Finally, it is argued that the codes ignore and provide no ethical guidelines when dealing with work that is based on financial conflicts of interest that afflict recent versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). Reflections on the possibility for postconventional codes are included.

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