Aristotle Metaphysics H6: a dialectic with Platonism

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to provide an interpretation of this last chapter of Metaphysics H which demonstrates where and how this question is answered. My hope is that the interpretation I shall present is able to resolve one of the disagreements about the content of this chapter, namely whether the object whose unity is primarily at issue in H6 is the form man or the composite man. H6 is a text which is frequently caught in the crossfire of competing interpretations of Aristotle's explanation of substantial unity. It thus seems important to establish how this chapter works just in itself. Before embarking on my interpretation of the chapter, let me begin by way of orientation with what I take to be uncontroversial remarks about Aristotle's project and strategy in H6.

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