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A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
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A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games (2002)A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Ga…Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games (1997)Asynchronous Choice in Repeat…Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model (1995)Perfect Equilibria in a Negot…A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games (1995)A Folk Theorem for Stochastic…The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition (1994)The Folk Theorem for Repeated…The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information (1994)The "Folk Theorem" for Repeat…On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games (1991)On the dispensability of publ…On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)On the Theory of Infinitely R…The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)The Folk Theorem in Repeated …Finitely Repeated Games (1985)Finitely Repeated GamesSurvey of Repeated Games (1981)Survey of Repeated GamesA Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames (1971)A Non-cooperative Equilibrium…Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games (2014)Asynchronicity and coordinati…Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion (1979)An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information (1991)Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences (1999)Using Turn Taking to Mitigate Coordination and Conflict Problems in the Repeated Battle of the Sexes Game (2008)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Social Norms and Economic Theory (1989)Measuring Trust* (2000)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (1990)Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known (1999)Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information (2013)Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation (1985)Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games (1993)Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem (2011)Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model (2014)Loss in the Time of Cholera: Long-Run Impact of a Disease Epidemic on the Urban Landscape (2020)Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Evolutionary game theory (1994)Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects (2009)Sixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans (2010)Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (1986)Evolutionary games on graphs (2007)Competition and Collusion in Dealer Markets (1997)An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism (2013)Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games (2018)A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles (1988)Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-party System with Rational Voters (1988)Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory (1991)Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation (2001)A Dynamic Theory of Holdup (2004)A model of seller holdout (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information2,375 cited
  • 1971A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames1,798 cited
  • 1988On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting1,259 cited
  • 1985Finitely Repeated Games517 cited
  • 1981Survey of Repeated Games271 cited
  • 1995A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games241 cited
  • 1997Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games130 cited
  • 1994The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition129 cited
  • 1991On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games116 cited
  • 1995Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model111 cited
  • 1994The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information68 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games42 cited

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