Do Incentives Matter? Managerial Contracts for Dual‐Purpose Funds

Abstract

We examine the contracts used to compensate the managers of the seven dual‐purpose investment companies that existed between 1967 and 1985 to determine whether financial incentives in fluence real behavior in the predicted way. The compensation contracts for these funds provided explicit incentives for the production of both capital gains and current income. We model the behavior that an expected compensation‐maximizing agent would exhibit when faced with such contracts and derive several testable implications. Our empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and so we are able to use this relatively clean setting to contribute to the growing literature concerned with determining the impact of incentive contracts on behavior. A unique and interesting aspect of this study is that the nature of these organizations allows us to provide evidence that the market understood and priced the behavior induced by these contracts.

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