Bargaining, Networks, and Management of Municipal Development Subsidies

Abstract

This article investigates why cities use fiscal analyses such as cost–benefit analysis and/or fiscal impact analysis to manage offers of economic development incentives to business. We advance an approach to understanding economic development subsidies and control mechanisms that integrate political bargaining and network theories. Municipal bargaining power, institutional incentives, and organizational networks are hypothesized to influence development subsidy decisions. The results confirm that local governments’ bargaining power and political institutions influence the degree to which cities use fiscal analyses. In addition, public/private organizational networks that bridge public and private sectors by linking quasigovernmental organizations and local governments increase information and credibility thus leading to greater use of fiscal analyses.

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