Aging as Becoming Oneself: A Philosophical Ethics of Late Life

Abstract

In constructing an abstract ethics of reason, addressing a general rational subject, Enlightenment and modernity have forgotten old age. By contrast, the ancient ethics of happiness asked what a good life might be for people in specific life stages, such as the aged. Nowadays, it is important to regain this tradition. Thus this chapter poses the question: What does it mean for a finite being to age but still lead a good life? During the process of aging, a radicalization of our vulnerable corporality and finitude takes place. This becoming-oneself-in-aging must be understood not only in its ethical meaning, but also implies a correction of our modern understanding of man. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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