Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly signaling model of apologyYohsuke Ohtsubo, Esuka Watanabe2008-11-10articleEvolution and Human Behavior166 citationsgreenNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Forgiveness and Related BehaviorsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEmotions and Moral BehaviorAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 166 citations exist upstream.References1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation1960The Strategy of Conflict1982Strategic Information Transmission1974Advertising as Information1989Passions within reason: the strategic role of the emotions1989The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task1990Biological signals as handicaps2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic ModelCited by2015Morality as Cooperation: A Problem-Centred Approach2022How Can It Be Made Right Again? A Review of Trust Repair Research2010On the Psychology of Financial Compensations to Restore Fairness Transgressions: When Intentions Determine Value2009Blood donations as costly signals of donor quality2015Signals in Stone: Exploring the Role of Social Information Exchange, Conspicuous Consumption, and Costly SignalingTheory in Lithic Analysis