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Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity

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2016

Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex Ante Relaxation

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2016Learning Simple Auctions70 cited

2019Revenue maximization for query pricing55 cited

2019Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity49 cited

2017Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples45 cited

2017The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation44 cited

2015Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items36 cited

2016Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading35 cited