A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences

1985-09-01articleEconometrica453 citationsclosed

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

Etude d'un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete. Caracterisation d'une classe d'equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l'unicite de cet equilibre

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References

1982Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

1953Two-Person Cooperative Games

2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model

1968Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points

1979Axiomatic Models of Bargaining

1972A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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2001Bargaining with Incomplete Information

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