Tyler Burge on disjunctivism (II)

John McDowell

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Philosophy, Science, and History

Abstract

In McDowell (2010), I responded to Burge's attack (2005) on disjunctivism. In Burge (2011) Burge rejects my response. He stands by his main claim that disjunctivism is incompatible with the science of perception, and in a supplementary spirit he argues against the detail of my attempt to defend disjunctivism. Here I explain how disjunctivism is compatible with the science, and I respond to some of Burge's supplementary arguments.

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References

1997Empiricism and the philosophy of mind 1982The varieties of reference 1994Mind and World 2001Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge 1995Knowledge and the Internal 2003Perceptual Entitlement*2001Mind, Value, and Reality 2001Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality

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