Like many of his contemporaries, Hegel considered Spinoza a modern reviver of ancient Eleatic monism, in whose system “all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void.” This characterization of Spinoza as denying the reality of the world of finite things had a lasting influence on the perception of Spinoza in the two centuries that followed. In this article, I take these claims of Hegel to task and evaluate their validity. Although Hegel’s official argument for the unreality of modes in Spinoza’s system will turn out to be unsound, I do believe there is one crucial line in Spinoza’s system—Spinoza’s rather weak and functional conception of individuality—thats provides some support for Hegel’s reading of Spinoza.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 122 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.