References

• 1983Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading2,512 cited
• 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
• 1979Incentives and incomplete information795 cited
• 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
• 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent586 cited
• 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations483 cited
• 1990Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents412 cited
• 1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design408 cited
• 1999A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms182 cited
• 2003The relevance of private information in mechanism design158 cited
• 1989Pollution claim settlements under private information146 cited
• 2004Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency141 cited
• 2002Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility114 cited
• 2005On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design113 cited
• 1994Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations102 cited