A reparameterization of the prisoner's dilemma game

Abstract

A parameterization of the prisoner's dilemma paradigm is constructed based on recent research on the theory of risk and risk preference. The conflict is cast as intrapersonal and in terms of a risk parameter and an inducement to accept the risk, sometimes interpretable as fear and greed respectively, both acting in the context of a level for the game relative to the status quo. These correspond to the independent variables directly under the control of the experimenter. The dependent variable is the strength of the tendency to defect. These variables are acting in the context of an experimental environment which includes the benevolence or hostility of another player which is assumed to contribute to the risk variable only. Some suggestions are made for the controlled study of conjoining a hostile environment.

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