POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND POSSIBLE COLLUSION IN FOREST SERVICE TIMBER AUCTIONS

Lance Eric Brannman

28 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Auction Theory and Applications Forest Management and Policy Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

Potential competition significantly affects the size of winning bids in Forest Service sealed‐bid timber auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral auctions. Winning sealed bids depend even more, however, on actual competition, a result suggesting collusion. This explanation is supported using an index representing the likelihood an auction was rigged. Preclusive bidding (a type of collusion) in oral auctions is indicated by a positive relationship between hauling distances and the size of winning sealed bids. Comparisons of winning‐bid variances, overbids, and numbers of bidders across auction type support this explanation of oral auction prices.

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1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities 1978Specification Tests in Econometrics 1981Optimal Auction Design 1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding 1964A Theory of Oligopoly 1993Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions 1986Social Goals and Social Organization 1987The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets

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