Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysisAxel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, Rainer Thiele2008-02-18articlePublic Choice391 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.International Development and AidInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyElectoral Systems and Political ParticipationAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 391 citations exist upstream.References1991Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations1998Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models1995Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models1995Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models2009How to do Xtabond2: An Introduction to Difference and System GMM in Stata2004A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators2000Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?2002Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?Cited by2013Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data2009Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council2018Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa2011Need, Merit, or Self‐Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?2010Expressive behavior in economics and politics2013Paying a visit: The Dalai Lama effect on international trade2010Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?2014Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly