Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions

Robert James Weber

141 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Economics & Management Strategy

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Auction Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis ICT Impact and Policies

Abstract

When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.

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2001Autonomous bidding agents in the trading agent competition 2003A polynomial-time nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games 2003Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany 2013Game Theory and Business Applications 2009The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion*2005Auctions in Theory and Practice 2003Decision-Theoretic Bidding Based on Learned Density Models in Simultaneous, Interacting Auctions 2000An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions

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