Market discipline and deposit insuranceAsli Demirgüç‐Kunt, Harry Huizinga2004-02-04articleJournal of Monetary Economics662 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Banking stability, regulation, efficiencyMonetary Policy and Economic ImpactInsurance and Financial Risk ManagementAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 662 citations exist upstream.References1998The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and Developed Countries2002Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation1990Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation1990Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking2001Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises1986Pricing Risk‐Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option‐Based Model1996Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983- 19911998Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical EvidenceCited by2009Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries2013How does competition affect bank systemic risk?2004The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence2005Cross-Country Empirical Studies of Systemic Bank Distress: A Survey2013How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis2008Finance, Financial Sector Policies, And Long-Run Growth2009The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison2008The regulatory response to the financial crisis