A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer

Moshe Babaioff · Nicole Immorlica · Brendan Lucier · Seth Matthew Weinberg

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Optimization and Search Problems

Abstract

In this letter we briefly survey our main result from [Babaioff el al. 2014]: a simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanism for a monopolist who wants to sell a variety of items to a single buyer with an additive valuation.

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1981Optimal Auction Design 2005The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction 2010Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing 2009Simple versus optimal mechanisms 2007Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations 2012Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization 2003Haggling over substitutes 2012An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

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