Articlegreen2011

Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

Abstract A central claim of Jones & Love's (J&L's) article is that Bayesian Fundamentalism is empirically unconstrained. Unless constraints are placed on prior beliefs, likelihood, and utility functions, all behaviour – it is proposed – is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Although such claims are commonplace, their basis is rarely justified. We fill this gap by sketching a proof, and we discuss possible solutions that would make Bayesian approaches empirically interesting.

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1971Subjectively expected utility theory and subjects' probability estimates: Use of measurement-free techniques.2004Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory

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2011Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism – Erratum

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