A k BA

Abstract

The allocation of discrete, complementary resources is a fundamental problem in economics and of direct interest to e-commerce applications.Combinatorial auctions account for complementarities by optimizing over oers expressed in terms of bundles.Progressive v ersions of combinatorial auctions alleviate the burden on bidders of expressing offers for all bundles of interest by p r o viding interim feedback based on partial sets of bids.Feedback i n t e r m s o f h ypothetical prices is particularly useful, as it directs bidders toward those bundles potentially yielding the greatest surplus.For a general class of discrete resource allocation problems with free disposal, we establish by construction the existence of competitive equilibrium prices on bundles that support the eÆcient allocation.We i n troduce AkBA, a family of progressive auctions that use these equilibrium bundle prices.We examine a particular instance of the family, called A1BA, and present some empirical data on its performance.

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