The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area*

Agnès Bénassy‐Quéré · Édouard Turkisch

16 citations0/0 files storedJCMS Journal of Common Market Studies

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European Monetary and Fiscal Policies Monetary Policy and Economic Impact European Union Policy and Governance

Abstract

Abstract We study the impact of rotating votes in the ECB Governing Council after EMU enlargement, based on national and euro‐wide Taylor rules and on a convergence assumption. We find that the rotation system yields monetary policy decisions that are close both to full centralization and to a voting rule without rotations.

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1993Discretion versus policy rules in practice 2005Are Two Heads Better Than One? Monetary Policy by Committee 2005Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey 2004The Quiet Revolution 2017The Quiet Revolution 2005Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting 2006Central Banking by Committee 1994Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions

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