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A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing
10 references·16 citing·44 second hop
A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Liability and Rent Sharing (2000)A Theory of Sales Quotas with Limited Lia…The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions (2011)The effects of bonus schemes …Quota-Based Compensation Plans for Multiterritory Heterogeneous Salesforces (1996)Quota-Based Compensation Plan…Compensation Plans for Single- and Multi-Product Salesforces: An Application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Model (1993)Compensation Plans for Single…Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (1990)Limited liability and incenti…Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1988)Justifying the First-Order Ap…Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective (1985)Salesforce Compensation Plans…Limited liability contracts between principal and agent (1983)Limited liability contracts b…Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1979)Rank-Order Tournaments as Opt…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityCommit on Effort or Sales? Value of Commitment in Live-streaming E-commerce (2024)Commit on Effort or Sales? Va…Optimal Monitoring Design (2020)Optimal Monitoring DesignSalesforce Contracting Under Uncertain Demand and Supply: Double Moral Hazard and Optimality of Smooth Contracts (2019)Salesforce Contracting Under …Financing Capacity Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: An Optimal Contracting Approach (2017)Financing Capacity Investment…Better Safe Than Sorry: Subsidiary Performance Feedback and Internal Governance in Multiunit Firms (2017)Better Safe Than Sorry: Subsi…Technical Note—Impact of Inventory on Quota-Bonus Contracts with Rent Sharing (2016)Technical Note—Impact of Inve…Optimal Sales Force Compensation in Dynamic Settings: Commissions vs. Bonuses (2016)Optimal Sales Force Compensat…The Impact of the Manufacturer-Hired Sales Agent on a Supply Chain with Information Asymmetry (2013)The Impact of the Manufacture…Firm‐specific human capital, organizational incentives, and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking (2013)Firm‐specific human capital, …Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans (2013)Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Prod…Bonuses versus Commissions: A Field Study (2013)Bonuses versus Commissions: A…Self-Control and Incentives: An Analysis of Multiperiod Quota Plans (2012)Self-Control and Incentives: …Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations (2012)Salesforce Compensation with …Incentive Life-cycles (2012)Incentive Life-cyclesSalesforce Contracting Under Demand Censorship (2011)Salesforce Contracting Under …Self-Control and Optimal Goals: A Theoretical Analysis (2009)Self-Control and Optimal Goal…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. 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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,033 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 2011The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions2,579 cited
  • 1990Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices925 cited
  • 1985Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective583 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1988Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems511 cited
  • 1993Compensation Plans for Single- and Multi-Product Salesforces: An Application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Model234 cited
  • 1996Quota-Based Compensation Plans for Multiterritory Heterogeneous Salesforces141 cited

Cited by

  • 2013Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans217 cited
  • 2013Firm‐specific human capital, organizational incentives, and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking127 cited
  • 2012Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations89 cited
  • 2012Incentive Life-cycles67 cited
  • 2013

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Bonuses versus Commissions: A Field Study
64 cited
  • 2011Salesforce Contracting Under Demand Censorship62 cited
  • 2017Better Safe Than Sorry: Subsidiary Performance Feedback and Internal Governance in Multiunit Firms61 cited
  • 2024Commit on Effort or Sales? Value of Commitment in Live-streaming E-commerce54 cited
  • 2012Self-Control and Incentives: An Analysis of Multiperiod Quota Plans51 cited
  • 2013The Impact of the Manufacturer-Hired Sales Agent on a Supply Chain with Information Asymmetry49 cited
  • 2016Optimal Sales Force Compensation in Dynamic Settings: Commissions vs. Bonuses49 cited
  • 2009Self-Control and Optimal Goals: A Theoretical Analysis48 cited
  • 2017Financing Capacity Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: An Optimal Contracting Approach44 cited
  • 2020Optimal Monitoring Design39 cited
  • 2016Technical Note—Impact of Inventory on Quota-Bonus Contracts with Rent Sharing34 cited
  • 2019Salesforce Contracting Under Uncertain Demand and Supply: Double Moral Hazard and Optimality of Smooth Contracts33 cited