Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games

René van den Brink · Yukihiko Funaki

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Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility , or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

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