The Prohibition of Ultimate Opinions: A Misguided Enterprise

Richard Rogers · Charles Patrick Ewing

20 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Forensic Psychology Practice

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Legal processes and jurisprudence Criminal Law and Evidence Jury Decision Making Processes

Abstract

During the 1980s, a coterie of scholars attempted to limit the scope of expert testimony by curtailing ultimate opinions. As its foremost proponent, Melton continues to champion this prohibition. This brief commentary attempts to understand the Meltonian perspective and its intolerance of ultimate and penultimate opinions. Issues include the ad populum thesis, the non-expert exclusion, and a usurpation hypothesis. Beyond Melton, the legal landscape of ultimate opinions is considered. Finally, we examine the untoward effects of categorically prohibiting ultimate opinion testimony.

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References

2000“Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct”1988Evaluating Competencies: Forensic Assessments and Instruments 1915On the witness stand: Essays in psychology and crime.2008Principles of Forensic Mental Health Assessment 1995Psychological test use in criminal forensic evaluations.1992Is it unethical to offer predictions of future violence?1984Mccormick on Evidence 1986Psychiatric and psychological evidence

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