Intergenerational Altruism and the Environment

Pierre‐André Jouvet · Philippe Michel · Jean‐Pierre Vidal

79 citations0/0 files storedScandinavian Journal of Economics

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Economic theories and models Climate Change Policy and Economics Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

We construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady‐state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals' altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized. JEL classification: D62; D64; D91

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1974Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?1985Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons 1989Existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with productive capital 1995Short-lived agents and the long-lived environment 1995Disutility of pollution and endogenous growth 1987Love Thy Children: Reflections on the Barro Debt Neutrality Theorem

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2013Environmental Quality, Public Debt and Economic Development 2008Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs 2002The Effects of Emission Permits on Growth and the Environment

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